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Michael Krausz’s Dialogues on Relativism, Absolutism, and Beyond: Four Days in 
India
1
 is a delightful and dialogical examination of the classical philosophical debate 
between relativism and absolutism about truth. The book is by far one of the best 
introductions to the debate for philosophers and non-philosophers. As a philosopher I 
was left wondering: why did 20
th
 century philosophy ever leave the dialogue format 
as a way of conveying philosophy to the masses? Krausz’s work reminded me of 
Arend Heyting’s dialogue Disputation. In this dialogue Heyting introduces the 
intuitionist theory of mathematics. He does this through a character that is involved in 
a casual debate with other mathematicians at a bar. Each of the interlocutors 
represents a different position in the foundations of mathematics, such as Formalism 
and Logicism.  
A great contribution of Krausz’s dialogue is that it is cross-cultural. It engages 
ideas from well-known philosophers in both Western and Eastern philosophy. 
However, and to the benefit of non-philosophers, the book makes no name-wise 
reference to key philosophers from either tradition. Instead, the knowledgeable reader 
can see insights from Parmenides, Plato, Nagarjuna, Wittgenstein, Davidson, Putnam, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism all at play. While the novice reader is introduced to 
complex ideas, such as reference frame, universalism, foundationalism, absolute 
relativism, bivalence, and self-realization without the excess jargon and name-
dropping that often makes presentation of these ideas inaccessible. 
  The work is ostensibly a dialogue between four discussants: Adam, Ronnie, Nina, 
and Barbara who all knew each other in college, and are meeting for a reunion in 
India on the banks of the Ganges River. The dialogue takes place over four days, each 
day being a continuation and further examination of the debate between relativism 
and absolutism about truth.  
 In what follows, I will give a short synopsis of the topics that are discussed on 
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each day, followed by a critical examination of the points made by some characters. 
The mode through which I will examine the views of the characters is by introducing 
a fifth character: Manjula. Manjula is not an advocate of any of the major positions 
examined in the work, although she is an advocate of some views familiar in 
contemporary philosophy, such as logical pluralism and virtue responsibilism about 
inquiry. She is also prone to a perspectival account of how relativism can be related to 
absolutism. In general, she has a fascination for examples from physics and art when 
she seeks to explain things. Most importantly, though, she is a critical discussant that 
seeks to reveal to others the presuppositions in their thought, as well as alternatives 
that are available in the space of inquiry. She aims to do this without undermining the 
authenticity of each person’s thoughts and direction of inquiry.  
 
DAY ONE 
 
The first day’s discussion takes as its point of departure a Hindu religious practice: 
the practice of cremating those that have lived impure lives, and burying in the 
Ganges River those that have lived pure lives. Most people fall into the former 
category. While the later category is reserved for Hindu sadhus, Buddhist monks, and 
newborn babies that have died prematurely. The fact under analysis is the belief, held 
by Hindus, and rejected by Non-Hindus, that the Ganges River is a holy river. From 
this point of departure, the topics to be discussed include: other examples of 
relativism, such as physical reality described in different ways, a definition of 
relativism, a clarification of what relativism is not, the difference between a reference 
frame and a fact of the matter, the role and possibility of an undifferentiated reality 
adjudicating between reference frames, and a puzzle concerning self-reference in the 
idea of relativism. The dialogue on the first day is centered on the differences 
between Adam, the absolutist, and Ronnie, the relativist. 
 
On relativism, fallibilism, and reference frames 
 
Ronnie (10): Relativism claims that truth, goodness, and beauty is relative to a 
reference frame, and that there are no absolute, overarching standards to adjudicate 
between competing references frames. 
 
Manjula: As an initial definition of relativism this seems to be okay. But we should 
immediately look for an alternative definition, because there seems to be an 
asymmetry between truth, on the one hand, and goodness and beauty, on the other. 
Claims of truth can be said to be relative, but to say that goodness and beauty are 
relative just reduces to saying that claims about goodness and beauty are relative. So 
all we are talking about here are claims in various domains being either relative or 
absolute. To say that goodness is relative is to say that the truth of a claim, such as ‘x 
is good’, is relative to something, such as a reference frame.  
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Ronnie (12): Fallibilism is the idea that, no matter what we believe, we could always 
be wrong. We can’t believe anything with complete certainty because, after all, we 
are human. 
 
Manjula: That sounds correct, as long as we are not talking about self-verifying 
claims, such as the claim that “I am here now”. That appears to be a claim that is true, 
and knowable with certainty when one reflectively considers the thought and upon 
believing it and saying it sincerely comes to know it. In addition, the fact expressed 
by an utterance of it captures part of the human condition. Namely, that at every 
instant of time at which we exist, we are located at some place. No one can be wrong 
about that. So, we need to clarify fallibilism. It should mean that with respect to some 
domain in which we form beliefs, we couldn’t be certain. For example, one might 
hold that we can never be certain that our beliefs about the future or the external 
world are true. For example, a skeptic might argue that I can never be certain about 
what will happen tomorrow, since the past does not give us certainty about the future; 
and that I can never be certain that what I am seeing now is actually the way the 
world is; since the true causes of my sense impressions of the external world are not 
transparent to me in my perceptions of the external world. 
 
Nina (18): Maybe there’s another snag with relativism. Ronnie, the second part of 
your definition mentions adjudication; that is, ranking between competing reference 
frames. But for reference frames to really compete with each other—rather than 
simply talking past each other—they would have to be talking about the same thing. 
If they don’t talk about the same thing, then they can’t compete. 
 
Manjula: Nina that sounds far too strong. There are two problems here. First, it might 
just be false that a necessary condition on two frames competing is that they are 
talking about the same thing. Instead, it might be that they simply have to be talking 
about roughly the same thing. That is, they need only be pointing in the same general 
direction to a degree that both parties can coherently understand a disagreement. For 
example, two competing views can describe the fundamental nature of reality in two 
distinct ways, such as the difference between positing strings vs. particles as the 
fundamental elements of reality. Even though the two theories are talking about 
distinct things—strings vs. particles—because both are aiming to capture the same 
rough area—the fundamental elements of reality—they can be said to be competing 
with each other. Second, it might be false that two theories need to be talking about 
the same thing or roughly the same thing, since the two different frames can compete 
with one another without their being anything out there for them to be talking about. 
In factive domains there are facts of the matter that we are competing to get right, but 
in non-factive domains, we may want each other to adopt certain emotions towards 
things, without their being a fact of the matter that we are trying to capture correctly. 
When two parties argue that you ought to care about something, they might be trying 
to get you to adopt an emotion towards something or a way of seeing things. The 
arguments they offer compete in the sense that they compete over what attitudes you 
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should adopt. However, there may be no fact of the matter as to what attitudes or 
emotions you should adopt, such that we can talk of competition with respect to 
getting it right. It is simply that the systems of attitudes are competing to get you to 
choose a certain set of emotions.   
 
Adam (22): By a fact of the matter, I mean facts that exist independent of any 
reference frame. Ultimately, a reality, as such, must exist independent of all reference 
frames. I’m disturbed by the idea of a world without facts of the matter.  
 
Manjula: Adam there is something right about what you are saying, and yet also 
something troubling. On the one hand, I don’t see how you could be wrong. To talk 
of a reference frame or a plurality of reference frames is to talk of a frame of 
reference relative to something that is not a frame of reference or at least something 
external to it. You might as well call the entities that are external to a given reference 
frame matters of fact. In general, frames of reference are frames onto something. But 
on the other hand, this just seems to be an artifact of the way the language we use 
forces us into thinking there is something there. Why can’t it just be frames upon 
frames upon frames all the way down? I reminded here of the person who says there 
has to be a foundation to all knowledge, or there has to be a first cause, because there 
cannot be an infinite regress of justification or causes. To this I might say: Yes there 
can be, the constraint you impose is imagined. It is unintelligible to you how there 
can be an infinite regress of justification, or causes, or reference frames, but this is a 
limitation of your ability to imagine otherwise. And perhaps the failure of your ability 
to imagine is a mark that certain presuppositions you hold serve as criteria for 
determining what counts as being coherent. The mark, however, should only be taken 
to mark a boundary in your ability to think or imagine. But not to demarcate a joint 
about how things must be in reality or for others.  
 
Nina (25): But Adam, this absolute stuff that you mention—this stuff that precedes 
our identifying any particular thing to be the thing that we take it to be—would have 
to be undifferentiated. At the same time, keeping in mind our definition of relativism 
that excludes absolutist standards for adjudication between reference frames, you 
would need differentiated facts of the matter to adjudicate between reference frames. 
Even if we had access to it, frame-independent undifferentiated stuff couldn’t provide 
those standards necessary for adjudication.  
 
Manjula: But Nina, I think the last part of what you said is a bit odd. Suppose 
someone or a group of people believe through their reference frame that there is only 
undifferentiated stuff. Couldn’t we say that their reference frame gets it right, since 
they are tracking the undifferentiated stuff? The undifferentiated stuff doesn’t provide 
standards for differentiating between certain kinds of reference frames, namely 
frames that are like the geocentric vs. heliocentric models of planetary motion 
because the undifferentiated stuff doesn’t have an “Earth” and a “Sun” within it. But 
a frame of reference doesn’t only have to be of that type. Sure, Ronnie is mostly 
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thinking about those kinds, but there are metaphysical frames of reference, and some 
of these might just say things like: there is a plurality of basic particulars, or there is 
only undifferentiated substance. If we widen the scope of what we think of as a 
reference frame, we might see that some reference frames get things right, and 
undifferentiated reality can play a role in adjudicating between certain reference 
frames. 
 
Adam (34). I guess that, whether you accept the answer that [it is relative to our 
context, our culture, or our time in history], depends upon whether you find the idea 
of a reference frame to be coherent. As you know, I continue to have doubts about 
that. 
 
On the notion of a frame of inquiry 
 
Manjula: But wait Adam, Ronnie, Nina, and Barbara. I wonder whether we have been 
led in the direction we have been going by the examples we have taken so far. That is 
we should be careful as to whether our own investigation of this issue is an example 
of being relative to a frame. Our inquiry itself could be relative to a certain kind of 
frame, a special kind of frame that I like to think of as a frame of inquiry. We started 
by thinking about the Hindu practice of burying newborn babies in the Ganges, and 
moved on to the example of physical matter. Considering cases in that order we had a 
certain direction of investigation. But what if we had started with mathematical truths, 
such as a = a, or 1 + 1 = 2? Would our investigation have lingered so long on issues 
of relativism vs. absolutism in the way we were talking about it? Or would we have 
assumed right away that we really should have been talking about certain truths being 
relative in certain domains, and other truths being absolute in other domains? It 
seems to me that relativism is initially attractive in certain areas of discourse, such as 
moral discourse. And in other areas, such as mathematics, it is less attractive. Had we 
started with an area where it is not as plausible, such as arithmetic, we probably 
would have been led down a distinct trajectory of inquiry and discussion. That is, we 
may have been led down a thought trajectory that brought us immediately to the 
question of relativism vs. absolutism in a domain. In this way we should always try to 
be meta-critical about our investigation by reflecting on how our frame of inquiry 
effects our first-order investigation, whether it be in ethics, metaphysics, 
epistemology, or, in the case at hand, the debate over relativism and absolutism about 
truth.  
 
DAY TWO 
 
The second day’s discussion is focused on the attempt to reconcile the difference 
between relativism and absolutism. The discussion focuses on two alternative views: 
relative absolutism and absolute relativism. The topics for the day include the 
distinction between ontic and epistemic absolutism and relativism, reconciliation by 
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values, bivalence, the distinction between domains and kinds, and relativism in 
morality and aesthetics.  
 
Alternatives to absolutism and relativism 
 
Barbara (36): Ok, then. How about this for reconciliation? How about a relative 
absolutism? Alternatively, how about an absolute relativism? 
 
Nina (36): Those possibilities sound contradictory, but you have me intrigued.  
 
Manjula: Barbara. There seems to be another option also. How about a perspectival 
account of the absolute and the relative?  
 
Nina (insert): Manjula that sounds intriguing also. What could that be? 
 
Manjula: Remember those interesting drawings we studied in art, psychology, and 
phenomenology class. The drawings where if you look at it one-way, you see one 
thing, and if you look at it another way, you see something else. 
 
Barbara (insert): You mean something like the Duck-Rabbit drawing, and the Young 
Woman–Old Lady drawing? You mean Figure-Ground-Gestalt drawings. 
 
Manjula: Exactly, you look at it one-way and you see the Duck, and then you look at 
it another way and you see the Rabbit. But when you are looking at the Duck, you 
don’t see, and cannot see, the Rabbit. And when you are looking at the Rabbit you 
don’t see, and cannot see, the Duck. And if you don’t know that there are two distinct 
creatures there in the drawing, you may never see anything other than the one you 
first lock on to. However, they are both there to be seen. Why can’t it be that 
relativism is one perspective on the way things are, and absolutism is another 
perspective on the way things are? And just like the Duck-Rabbit scenario this would 
explain why Adam and Ronnie think that both cannot be right. If I remember class 
correctly Ronnie saw the Duck first and Adam saw the Rabbit first. Maybe they both 
think they can’t be right because they are locked into one perspective, and they 
cannot find the orientation for the other perspective. My point, Barbara, is that 
reconciliation does not need to come from combining absolutism and relativism 
through a logical move, it can also come from recognizing that both positions are 
perspectives from which to see the fundamental nature of reality. In fact we could say 
that they are meta-reference frames, frames for thinking about the ultimate nature of 
reality, from which we look at first-order frames, such as two distinct models of some 
phenomenon.  
 
Barbara (39): Ok [as a case of absolute relativism], take the geometry case again. 
There’s no fact of the matter whether the shortest distance between two points is a 
straight line independent of a given geometry. The shortest distance between two 
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points is a straight line in Euclidean geometry and it isn’t in a non-Euclidean 
geometry, like Riemannian geometry. It depends on what you take as a first principle. 
There’s your absolute relativism.  
 
Manjula: Barbara that is a great example, I wish we had talked about it yesterday 
when we were first thinking about these issues. I have two points on this. First, given 
the way you describe it, I think it is right to say there is no fact of the matter. 
However, once I tell you that in fact we live in a curved space, there is a fact of the 
matter about what is the shortest distance between two points. Moreover, as long as 
we are looking just at systems, it will be true that each geometric system defines 
shortest distance in a distinct way. However, once we say how things are, then the 
other system just gets it wrong. These systems are systems that aim to capture 
something external to them. 
My second point is that the example reveals another sense in which something 
can be absolute. For both Euclidean and Riemannian geometry to be kinds of 
geometries as opposed to sea plankton, there must be something in common. Sure 
they can differ over how they answer the question of what the shortest distance is 
between two points, but there must be something in common between all geometric 
systems for the systems to all count as being about geometry. For example, in the case 
at hand, the systems are all used to describe space. Can’t we say that the thing in 
common is in fact the real absolute across all of these things? And that they just give 
different answers to specific questions, because they are, after all, different systems. 
The goal of these systems is to model something. They are systems that aim to get 
things right for certain purposes. That is, they are all absolutely geometric systems, 
but they all answer specific questions differently depending on other components of 
what the system says. More importantly, they answer things differently because the 
models maintain that things external to the system work differently. 
 
Ronnie (40): You understand my position correctly, Adam. I believe that we never 
have access to the world, because any knowledge we do have is filtered through some 
reference frame, through some description of what there is. We can know the world 
only as conceptualized in one way or another. So, when we seek to compare a 
description of the world with the world itself, we are comparing a description with 
another description. All we can compare is one description with another description, 
not a description with the world-as-it-is-in-itself. 
 
Manjula: I think your account of relativism here is coherent. But I have one problem 
with it Ronnie. Why use the term ‘knowledge’? If you are going to deny that we have 
access to the world as it is, and knowledge of the world is knowledge of the world as 
it is, then it seems like we have no knowledge. It is fine if you want to change what 
we commonly mean by knowledge. But it appears that when Barbara says she knows 
she is hungry she is trying to say she knows how the world is. It is one in which there 
is a hungry Barbara. Likewise, when I say, “I know that California is west of New 
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York.”, I know it only if California is west of New York. Can relativism of the sort 
you seek really have knowledge? What would knowledge be on such an account? 
 
Alternatives to classical logic 
 
Barbara (44): We typically assume that truth opposes falsity. It’s the same thing with 
goodness and beauty. We typically mean to contrast good with bad, or beautiful with 
ugly. They appear to exclude one another.  
 
Barbara (44) Here is the thing. The negation of each amounts to the affirmation of 
the other. When you negate true, you get false. When you negate good, you get bad. 
When you negate beautiful, you get ugly. They are like a standard on-off light switch. 
 
Manjula: Barbara I know you don’t really think that. Remember what that strange 
Indian logician, Anand, taught us in college. He told us about Polish, Australian, 
Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu logicians that had different ways of thinking about truth 
and falsity, if not also good and bad, and beautiful and ugly. He pointed out that in 
logic not everyone agrees with the views espoused by Aristotle and Frege. Western 
and Eastern philosophers have challenged what has come to be known as classical 
logic. 
 
Nina (inserted): Manjula, I remember Anand. I know what you are getting at. Explain 
more for the others. 
 
Manjula: In general, we should note that there are two principles that classical logics 
accept. One is the Law of Excluded Middle, which says that either P is true or P is 
false, and there is no third value. Another is the Law of Non-Contradiction, which 
says that P cannot be both true and false; that is, a proposition can have only one 
value. In Anand’s class he pointed out that in addition to classical logics, there are 
non-classical logics, such as trivalent logics where P can either be true, false, or 
undetermined. And there are intuitionistic logics where the Law of Excluded Middle 
is rejected because the law allows for proofs by contradiction that some 
mathematicians don’t accept. Finally, he also introduced us to paraconsistent logics 
where P can be both true and false. My favorite logical system is the Jain logical 
system, in which a statement can either be (i) true, (ii) false, (iii) true and false, (iv) 
unsayable, (v) true and unsayable, (vi) false and unsayable, and (vii) true, false and 
unsayable. 
Moreover, it is important for us to examine how the logic of reasoning we assume 
in our inquiry determines the space of alternatives we consider and accept. The 
importance of taking note of these facts about our reasoning is that they allow us to 
see that we need to reflect on our frame of inquiry from a logical point of view. I 
believe that this is what Anand was trying to tell us. In his discussions of alternative 
logics he wasn’t advocating for one view or the other. Rather, he was trying to help us 
see how our most basic assumptions about what counts as good and bad reasoning 
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plays a role in determining our path of inquiry. Being locked into a certain kind of 
reasoning is like being locked into a certain kind of moral framework. If I believe that 
only one species has a fundamental right to life, I am going to have a problem 
imagining or understanding how another species could have a fundamental right to 
life. Think of the debates about moral vegetarianism. Likewise, if I am locked into 
thinking that everything is either true or false, I may not be able to understand or 
imagine how something could be undetermined, or how contradictions could be true. 
I may fail to grasp a perspectival conception of reality.   
 
Ronnie (inserted): Hey Manjula. Doesn’t that show that our reasoning is also a frame 
of reference from which we proceed in inquiry? 
 
Barbara (inserted): Wait I think Manjula is talking about absolute relativism. Given 
what system we accept for our reasoning certain answers will turn out to be 
intelligible, and others won’t. If we accept the Law of Non-contradiction, maybe we 
cannot understand how absolutism and relativism can both be true. But if we accept 
some other view, then perhaps we can see how they could both be true.  
 
Manjula: Yes that might be right Barbara. Maybe that is why the perspectivalism I 
offered earlier with the Duck-Rabbit drawing as an analogy for understanding 
absolutism and relativism made sense to me. I was operating under a frame of 
reasoning that allows for both positions to be true at the same time. The Duck-Rabbit 
drawing allows for me to conceive of how they can both be true at the same time. 
However, we should note that there are some differences between the Duck-Rabbit 
case and the relativism vs. absolutism case. Remember, the relativism vs. absolutism 
debate is about truth. So, the idea that both absolutism and relativism can be true in 
the way that there can both be a Duck and a Rabbit present in the Duck-Rabbit 
analogy needs to be thought through carefully. At present, it intrigues me as a 
possible way to find harmony in the standard opposition between the two positions. 
 
On opposites 
 
Barbara (insert): But what about good and bad, and beautiful and ugly? You said 
they work differently also. 
 
Manjula: Yes! I think it is partially right to say that we commonly mean to use those 
words as opposites, but I don’t think that is completely accurate. I don’t think that the 
opposite of ‘good’ is ‘bad’. It could be simply: ok. Suppose we go to the museum and 
I say to you, “that painting is not good.” And you say to me well “it is not bad.” We 
don’t have to be disagreeing. We could both think that it is just okay, likewise with 
‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’. The general point is the following. If you take the words and 
our uses of truth and falsity as being bivalent and then use them as a model for 
thinking about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’, you are likely to think of 
these pairs in the same way you think about truth and falsity. But if you open up your 
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mind to other examples, you will see something else. Lets return to the idea of a 
frame of inquiry and begin with the example of ‘large’ and ‘small’ to see how our 
frame of inquiry effects our trajectory in inquiry. If you say, “it is not large”, it 
doesn’t follow that “it is small”; you could mean that the thing in question is simply 
medium in size. And that seems to be a natural way to look at judgments of size.  
Now, if we had started with this example, and then moved on to the case of ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’, I think we would likely have seen, at least more quickly, that ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ work like ‘large’ and ‘small’, rather than like ‘true’ and ‘false’. However, we 
could even go further and use ‘large’ and ‘small’ as a model for ‘true’ and ‘false’. 
This would lead us to the conclusion that perhaps there is a third option. The negation 
of true doesn’t have to be false. It could be something else, such as being 
undetermined.  
 
On lenses and filters 
 
Nina (47): Well if our understanding is always filtered somehow, it seems that it’s 
filtered regardless of what we look at. That suggests that if we’re relativists, we have 
to be relativists across the board. Otherwise, we’d have to take off our glasses when 
we’re looking at certain things and put them on when we’re looking at other things. 
That would be strange. 
 
Ronnie (47): But you know what? We all wear glasses all the time. We all have lenses 
in our eyes. In addition to that, the brain interprets what it receives from our optical 
nerves. We never can just see what is before us to start with.  
 
Manjula: Nina and Ronnie I am puzzled by all of this talk of flittering and lenses. The 
point I don’t get is this. You seem to be assuming that if x is an interpretation of y via 
a filter or lens f, and then x cannot correctly capture y via f. I don’t get that. 
Sometimes filtering something out allows one to focus on something they want to get 
at—consider infrared glasses. Sometimes lenses and filters allow one to capture 
something that is desired. Think of a water filter. A water filter purifies water so that 
we can get what we really need—pure water. A magnifying lens helps us see things 
that are small.  
Ronnie, even if we are wearing glasses all the time and interpreting things, that 
doesn’t mean that we are not getting at reality through those lenses and interpretations 
or getting at what we want or need to get at. It might just mean that we cannot know 
that we are getting things right simply by looking through our glasses. 
 Nina, even if the glasses are on all the time, which you claim requires us to be 
relativists across the board, we need to recognize that sometimes the glasses may be 
getting things right, and sometimes it maybe getting things wrong, and like I just said, 
we just don’t know it. For example, suppose we have glasses that turn everything red. 
When we are in a white room, we see red everywhere, and we don’t see things 
correctly. However, when we step into a red room, we do get things right. We just 
don’t know it, because we don’t know that we have red glasses on. So, we could say 
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that in some cases things are relative to our red glasses because they look red but are 
not red; and in other cases things are red relative to our glasses, but that is also the 
way things are. Sometimes we mirror sometimes we distort. The point is that we 
might not be able to transcend our lenses, but that doesn’t mean we don’t get things 
right. Part of the problem is that we have been thinking about lenses and filters with 
negative imagery and association. If we change that imagery and association, it might 
not be the case that filters are a problem.  
 
Nina (52): Ronnie, I see that you mean for your relativism to apply across the board –
for all domains. So, how does it apply to the moral case? 
 
Intervention and morality 
 
Manjula: Ronnie, before you give your answer, I want you to also give us an answer 
for the case of logic and mathematics; and if you could, please compare you answer 
to what you have to say in the moral case. I often think it is easier to be a relativist in 
the case of morality and aesthetics than it is to be one in the case of logic and 
mathematics. As I said yesterday, I think there is a lot of insight into the debate we 
can gain by comparing relativism and its plausibility across different domains.  
 
Ronnie (54): Some people might believe that, because our knowledge is frame-
dependent, we shouldn’t criticize or intervene in other cultures. I don’t see it that 
way. Criticism and intervention can be important –critically important. The frame-
dependence of our framework shouldn’t silence us or keep us from intervening when 
necessary. 
 
Manjula: Ronnie, I think you are right. But I would go further. I don’t think that 
relativism or absolutism about moral truths either weakens or enhances our ability to 
intervene. What weakens or enhances our position for intervention is our theory of 
when it is right or wrong to intervene. Consider the following. If relativism is true, it 
could be the case that all moral codes relative to each culture say that the members of 
that culture should intervene on other cultures no matter how different the other codes 
are. If absolutism is true, the truth could be that we should never intervene, but simply 
recognize that others are doing wrong. The ultimate code could say that even if others 
are not following the moral code one should not intervene to make them do so 
because that involves harm. That is, other people’s immorality is not one’s own affair. 
What matters for a theory of intervention are those particular aspects of our moral 
theory that have to do with when it is appropriate to intervene. We tend to think that if 
something is absolutely wrong, then we are justified in intervening, but the part that is 
really doing the work is that we also think that the thing in question is wrong and we 
ought to alter those that do don’t do what is correct. The part that says it is absolutely 
wrong is not as important as our thoughts about intervention.  
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DAY THREE 
 
The third day’s discussion focuses on an attempted refutation of relativism and a 
clarification of different kinds of relativism and absolutism that goes beyond the 
distinction between ontic and epistemic kinds discussed on the second day. Topics 
include: self-refutation, realism, universalism, foundationalism, moral cases, the 
value of human life, religion, and hard vs. soft absolutism and relativism. We begin 
with a discussion of whether and why relativism is thought to be self-refuting. 
 
Relativism and self-refuting positions 
 
Ronnie (63): Sure. [The argument for why relativism is self-refuting] goes something 
like this. Suppose that we say that relativism is true. Then you ask, well, if it’s true, in 
what sense are you saying it’s true? Is relativism true in an absolute sense or is it true 
in a relative sense? Clearly, if I say it’s absolutely true, then I’d be contradicting 
myself. That’s the first part of the argument. On the other hand, to avoid the 
contradiction, I might say, relativism is relatively true. Then you’d ask, relative to 
what? Then I’d say, relative to a reference frame. Then you’d say, well then your 
relativism wouldn’t be very convincing to anyone who doesn’t share your reference 
frame, would it? That’s the second part of the argument. Right now, I’m mostly 
concerned with the first part of the argument.  
 
Manjula: This argument reminds me of the classical refutation of the verification 
principle of meaning. Remember we learned about it in our History of 20
th
 century 
philosophy class. The Logical Empiricists in the early part of the 20
th
 century 
believed that the only kinds of sentences that had cognitive value / meaning were 
sentences that were verifiable. Their thesis was (V): A sentence S is cognitively 
valuable if and only if S is verifiable through observation. So, for example, the 
sentence ‘There is a chair in this room.’ is meaningful, if and only if, it is verifiable; 
and since we can verify it, it is meaningful. From this verification principle, they went 
on to argue that the sentence ‘God exists.’ is not meaningful, since it cannot be 
verified, but that the sentence, ‘There are four moons on the largest planet in the next 
galaxy.’ was meaningful, because in principle we could verify it, even if we didn’t 
have the technology. One criticism of the verification principle is similar to what 
Ronnie is concerned about with respect to relativism being self-refuting. Consider the 
principle itself. Either V is meaningful or not? If V is meaningful, then by V, it is 
verifiable, but V is not, since we don’t know how to verify all the possible sentences 
that can be constructed to see if the thesis is true. But V also appears to be 
meaningful, since we can understand it, so V must be false. So the principle, refutes 
itself when applied to itself, since it is meaningful yet unverifiable.  
 I think that there is a general issue here we need to pay attention to. It is the issue 
of scope and self-application concerning principles. Is it possible for one to be a 
relativist about truth or a verificationist about meaning and to limit the scope of 
application of the principles? That is, can one say that the relativist and the 
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verificationist principles are meta-principles? Principles that tell us how things are, 
but are in a sense out of the scope of what they apply to. They tell us the rules of the 
game, but the rules they present don’t apply to them. If we take this strategy, then we 
are out of the problem. Since we don’t intend for the rules to apply to the rules. In 
general we should be worried about cases where we are talking about everything. 
Those cases often lead to paradox. It is best to limit the scope of application for the 
rules. Relativism and Verificationism could be true, if we limit the scope 
appropriately. On this account, they tell us about the nature of reality by being 
articulated as principles, but they are out of the scope of application. 
 
Reality and the nature of questions and explanations 
 
Barbara (67): But you could deny that there’s an ultimate constituent out of which 
everything else is made. You could keep unpacking constituents indefinitely. You 
could ask, “What are electrons made of?” “What are photons made of?” and on and 
on. The question is always there, regardless of whether you’ve really gotten down to 
the ultimate constituent.  
 
Nina (67): Yes. The foundationalist says that there is an ultimate constituent. The 
non-foundationalist says that there is no such thing as an ultimate constituent. 
 
Manjula: This exchange is interesting. I think that Nina is right in asserting that there 
are at least two positions. However, there is also a third. The third position is that 
there are ultimate constituents and there are not ultimate constituents. It depends on 
how you look at it. The analogy I would give would use the example of light, which 
has a fundamental dual nature of being a particle and a wave. It is both a particle and 
a wave, and given that particles are not waves, to say it has this nature is to say that it 
is something that is both F and not-F. This dual nature is fundamental to it. Likewise, 
we could say that reality has a fundamental dual nature: to have ultimate constituents 
and to not have fundamental constituents.  
But Barbara’s argument also illuminates another interesting cognitive trap. Just 
because we can continue to apply a question-type to a specific answer to a question, it 
doesn’t follow that the question still makes sense.  
 
Adam (insert): The first point is an interesting option. That reality has and does not 
have fundamental constituents. But the second point I don’t get. Can you explain 
Manjula? 
 
Manjula: Sure Adam. As children we all figure out that we can always respond to an 
explanation of something with the question: why? Your parents tell you that clouds 
are the source of rain, you ask: why? Then they tell you because of the condensation 
of water…. And you ask: why? But eventually your parents get frustrated and tell you 
to stop. Now in some cases, you really want more, and there is more. But it is 
possible that explanations just come to an end, they hit bedrock, as Wittgenstein 
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would have said. However, when they do, it is important to notice that we can still 
ask: why? So, the mere fact that we can ask “why?” doesn’t mean that we have not 
reached bottom. The fact that we can continue to ask why doesn’t always signal that 
there is a further answer. It just illustrates a fact about how our language works. The 
fact that you can ask me why I am hungry, and I can just say because I am, might just 
be the end of it. It is not just that I don’t know a further answer. It might just be that 
there is no further answer. 
 
Compatibility and forcing 
 
Nina (80): All right. My overriding point is that the very idea of absolutism comes in 
different strands –realism, universalism, and foundationalism. Whatever problems we 
might have with any single one of those strands, just negating it—as a relativist might 
do—won’t result in a logical contradiction. You might disagree with realism or non-
realism. You might disagree with universalism or non-universalism. You might 
disagree with foundationalism or non-foundationalism. But none of them are self-
contradictory. 
 
Manjula: Nina I think that you are absolutely right to force us to distinguish these 
things. And to bring to our attention that none of them are self-contradictory alone. 
But I think we have to add two points. All these different strands are distinct, but that 
doesn’t mean they are all compatible. Let’s assume bivalence for a moment, and 
distinguish between universalism, foundationalism, and realism. The first point is that 
a compatibilist will say that any combination of these is compatible, and an 
incompatibilist will say that some of them are incompatible. The second point is that 
if we go further and consider the theses as they apply to specific domains, such as the 
moral, aesthetic, religious, logical, and mathematical domains, we may find that when 
we accept one thesis in one domain, such as foundationalism about logic, we are 
forced to accept a certain position in a distinct domain, such as universalism about 
mathematics. Moreover, we need to be sensitive to the fact that distinguishing 
different strands doesn’t always mean that the combinations thus made available are 
all compatible and plausible, and that accepting one thesis in one domain, may force 
or preclude accepting another thesis in another domain. And this again will be a 
function of the kind of reasoning we allow ourselves in our inquiry, bivalence vs. 
paraconsistency, for example.  
 
DAY FOUR 
 
The fourth day’s discussion focuses on going beyond relativism and absolutism. The 
topics include: the supposed opposition between relativism and absolutism, the nature 
of argumentation and self-realization, dissolving distinctions, the nature of negation, 
suffering, intentionality, the notion of what can be said in words, meditation, and the 
nature of minds. 
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Argumentation 
 
Nina (88): What other purposes might there be for giving reasons, other than 
convincing someone of the truth or falsity of a belief? 
 
Barbara (88): When relativists offer reasons to the absolutist, they need not try to 
convince the absolutist. Relativist may give reasons or arguments just to present their 
views in an orderly way to promote a better understanding of their view. Without 
aiming to convince another person to embrace their view, relativists might seek to 
share their rationale for embracing their view.  
 
Manjula: I agree with much of what Barbara says. However, I think there is another 
way to get at the point. We need to introduce the notion of the intended audience of 
the reasons-giving exercise and the notion of the purpose of the reasons-giving 
exercise. Some people are undecided about relativism and absolutism (or some debate 
in general). And when the relativist and the absolutist aim at the undecided they aim 
to give them reasons to embrace their view or understand their view, much as Barbara 
points out. These reasons in some sense gain traction because the undecided person is 
impartial and open-minded to hearing both sides. However, the nature of the reasons- 
giving exercise is different when the audience is the one who holds the opposing 
view. In that case we have to distinguish between hardened debate and positioned-
inquiry. In hardened debate I think that Barbara is right, they are just screaming past 
each other and they cannot really change each other’s point of view because they are 
not open minded. In some sense, in a hardened exchange each opponent represents a 
personality type. A good example of this is what you see in some political exchanges 
where hardened liberals and conservatives debate each other by largely using illicit 
moves of debate because they don’t agree on much and have completely different 
value systems. But in positioned-inquiry each participant has a point of view, but is 
open-minded. They are open to changing their point of view because they realize that 
they may discover something in the exchange. When the purpose of the exchange is 
positioned-inquiry, I don’t think that relativism and absolutism are playing different 
games with one another. For example, in positioned-inquiry an absolutist can 
convince a relativist to become an absolutist because the relativist did not see that his 
position, as Ronnie pointed out, is potentially self-refuting. Upon gaining the insight 
of the potential self-refuting nature of relativism, the relativist may switch sides. 
Likewise, an absolutist, who does not know that all perception is potentially filtered, 
may, upon realizing that component of the human condition, switch sides as well.  
I think the key is that we need to understand what is going on in the exchange and 
the virtues of inquiry that are at play in the participants. Are they open-minded, 
curious, creative, courageous, and patient in their examination of the evidence and in 
their intellectual engagement? Or are they negligent in their examination of the 
evidence and in their intellectual engagement? We can all choose to be virtuous in our 
inquiry with one another. And that is very different from choosing to be hardened and 
agenda driven in our exchanges.   
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On what we seek 
 
Nina (91): It’s quite simple, really. It’s something we all seek. We all seek freedom 
from suffering of old age and death. We all seek freedom from the anxieties 
associated with our mortality. Self-realization –realizing who we really are– alleviates 
us from the anxiety of our finitude. Who we really are is One, without limit. Who we 
really are is indivisible, infinite, eternal, and free. All of us are embodiments of the 
One. 
 
Manjula: Nina, I for one want those things –at least freedom from suffering and my 
constant anxiety about my purpose in the world. But I feel uncomfortable saying that 
what I want is something that everyone wants or really seeks. It sounds paternalistic 
and a bit condescending. I feel uncomfortable saying that even if they say they don’t 
want those things, they really want those things, and they just don’t realize it. I feel 
like it is wrong to legislate to others what they really want and who they really are. It 
is a way of forcing them into thinking something is wrong with them if they don’t 
want it or they don’t see it after trying to understand it.  
Many people suffer in order to bring meaning to their moments of joy. We don’t 
seek the complete alleviation of suffering, because we think it would rob us of our 
humanity. We affirm our humanity and the true human condition through our joint 
suffering. However, this is consistent with recognizing a spiritual self, and seeking 
cultivation of it, as well as desiring to avoid unnecessary pains that one does not 
chose to take on.  
 
On the nature of Oneness and category mistakes 
 
Nina (97): OK. Look at it this way. Your question reduced to the question, “What is 
the relation of Oneness—the realm of no relations—to the realm of differentiated, 
countable individuals and their relations?” By just asking that question, you’re 
rejecting the idea that there could be a realm of no relations. In the realm of no 
relations, there’s no question of the relation between it and the realm of relations. 
Your very question disallows the realm of no relations. 
 
Manjula: I agree with you Nina, but I think the way you are explaining it might be 
confusing. Let’s just return to the question we discussed earlier about fundamental vs. 
non-fundamental constituents of reality. In that discussion Barbara wanted to do the 
same thing she is doing here—inferring from the fact that a question makes perfect 
sense, that the question applies in a given case. What we need to make clear is that 
the question, “What relation does Oneness have to the realm of relations?” is a 
category mistake. Though it is grammatically correct. It is like asking, “Does 2 have 
parents from Mumbai?” Unless I mean something different by ‘parents’ and ‘2’ then 
what is normally meant, this question ought to strike everyone as really odd. 
Likewise, although the question Barbara asks is grammatically well formed, and an 
application of a legitimate set of ideas, it doesn’t apply, since ONENESS isn’t the 
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kind of thing that has or bears relations, just like soup isn’t the kind of thing that has a 
square root. 
 
Barbara (101): Nina, you’ve said that what there ultimately is, is relative and 
absolute, but neither relative nor absolute. How can that be? 
 
Manjula: Before Nina gives her explanation, I think it might be important to point out 
that the claim is that the ultimate, call it U, is both absolute, call it A, and relative, call 
it R, yet neither. So it would look like this: 
(1) [(U is A) & (U is R)]. 
(2) [(U is A) & (U is R)]. 
Which conjoined is: 
(3) {[(U is A) & (U is R)] & [(U is A) & (U is R)]} 
Now if A is the strict opposite of R, we can substitute in F for A, and F for R, and 
reduce (3) to: 
(4) {[(U is F) & (U is F)} & [(U is F) & (U is F)]} 
But this is only a problem and confusing if we accept the Law of Excluded Middle 
(LCM): either P is true, or P is false; and the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC): it is 
not the case that both P is true and P is false. What are the reasons for accepting these 
principles? I think Barbara is asking for an explanation from this background. I don’t 
think we can satisfy that demand. 
 Rather, we might want to accept a form of logical pluralism, where we accept that 
in certain domains we ought to accept LCM and LNC, but that in other domains we 
ought not to. And I think Nina might be right to think that when we are thinking about 
the fundamental nature of reality being ONENESS, we ought to think of these 
principles as not applying. I would add, that when we are thinking about practical 
matters, such as how to get from Benares to Madras, we probably want to accept both 
principles. In general, the rules of how we reason may be dictated by the nature of the 
thing we are reasoning about. Practical reasoning about directions has one set of rules 
and reasoning about the fundamental nature of reality has a distinct set of rules. And 
yes there is a basic logical principle that tells us to use the appropriate kind of 
principles relative to the given domain of inquiry. However, each logical system is a 
true logic, and the appropriate means to good and effective reasoning in its respective 
domain.   
 
On language and dissolving a debate 
 
Barbara (116): Nina, you seem to think that the debate between Adam and Ronnie 
dissolves because language can’t capture the way things are. You think that language 
is inherently limited because of its essentially dualistic nature. So, since both Adam 
and Ronnie’s arguments—inevitably in a language—seek to capture how things are, 
they both must fail to do so.  
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Nina (116) Yes, that’s pretty well it. The debate dissolves itself. It deconstructs itself. 
That’s why I think we should move on and ask the deeper question, namely, what we 
really want. My answer is that we really want to eliminate or at least minimize 
suffering as individual human beings.  
 
Manjula: Wait Nina. I agree—in that I also want to eliminate suffering. But I am 
confused by your answer to Barbara. Isn’t there a difference between a natural 
language and a formal language, such as between English and a programming 
language, such as C++? Are you saying that every language has to be dualistic 
essentially, that there are no non-dualistic languages, and that a non-dualistic 
language could never be constructed? I find that hard to believe. We know that 
Sanskrit and Hopi are different languages, and we know that C++ and Java are 
different languages. With all the differences out there couldn’t there already be or at 
least be constructed a language that served the function you are talking about. 
Couldn’t we argue in a language where we don’t distort reality? This seems to me to 
be the same point that I found to be odd about our earlier discussion concerning 
lenses and filters. It seems like we always think that because something may not 
capture everything, that it distorts or falsifies or doesn’t allow us to get at things in 
some important way. But this comes about by imposing a negative meta-frame on the 
words ‘lens’, ‘language’, and ‘filter’. These terms could also have positive readings, 
such as in filtering out the impure, speaking the language of truth, or lenses for 
seeing the prism of light.  
 
On the nature of experience and shared mental states 
 
Barbara (120): […] However beneficial meditation might be for each of us in 
different ways, I wonder whether we could really know whether what you will have 
experienced and what I will have experienced is the same, or whether it will have 
enabled us to grasp the ultimate reality. I wonder whether the Hindus, Buddhists, and 
visitors all might be in the same situation.  
 
Manjula: I think this is a great question Barbara. But I think we need to be more 
critical. On the one hand, I would say that because the experiences are never strictly 
identical, it couldn’t be the case that we know them to be strictly identical. My 
experience of red has me implicated in it, and your experience of red has you 
implicated in it. So, at the relative level, Nina speaks of, we cannot have the same 
experience, and at the ultimate level where we are not different there would be 
nothing to speak of. But staying at the relative level of individuality, I would say that 
we can have justified beliefs about what we are each experiencing because there are 
natural connections between our bodily and facial expressions and our internal states. 
Wincing in pain and smiling with joy can of logical possibility be inverted, but they 
cannot of natural normal animal development be inverted. At the natural relative 
level, our facial expressions allow us to see what is most likely going on inside. And 
though we can fake a smile, a keen eye can discern the fake from the real by taking 
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note of the relation between the curves of the lips, the top of the forehead, and the 
gaze in the eye. So, I would say the kind of knowledge you seek is impossible, but 
that the justified beliefs that we need for communication are available.  
 
Adam (124): I’m so much looking forward to all of us reconnecting at our next 
reunion when we can discuss these things further. 
 
Manjula: I am also. I think we all had a positioned inquiry, and even though none of 
us changed sides we learned valuable aspects of each other’s position. I look forward 
to seeing how what I have learned here may, in another context and discussion, lead 
to a different unfolding of thoughts.  
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